Rev Fin 1989; 2:495-526
© 1989 the Society for Financial Studies
Article |
Trade and the revelation of information through prices and direct disclosure
Stanford University, Stanford, USA
Abstract
This article analyzes the volume of trade in a multiperiod noisy rational expectations model. When traders receive private signals at the first trading date and are allowed a second round of trade, two type of equilibria exist. In the first, traders do not learn about the average private signal from the second round of trade, and all trade takes place at the first date. In the second, traders do learn from the second round, and trade thus takes places at both the first and second dates. The article characterizes volume when a public signal is disclosed at the second date.
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